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Political Economy and Public Choice have studied the interactions between the economy and 
the polity for over 60 years now. The present paper endeavours to provide a critical discussion 
of this literature and its achievements. In particular, it starts with the different approaches 
based on empirically tested or politometric models, and it then proceeds to discuss different 
studies of the effects that particular rules of the game have on politico-economic outcomes. 
The third part will deal with studies that take institutions to be endogenous and aim at ex-
plaining why particular institutions emerge. Finally, the question whether political economy 
has been a success or a failure will be tackled. While the success in terms of the position 
gained in economic research and teaching is undeniable, a look at one of the most thriving 
recent areas of economics, namely happiness research, will reveal that fundamental lessons all 
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Introduction 
Economic activity is influenced by political decisions, and political decisions are influenced 
by the state of the economy. Their interaction, which is captured by the evaluation and the 
policy functions – as shown in Figure 1 – is so obvious that few people would deny it.  
 
Figure 1: The interaction between the economy and the polity. 
 
The relationship between the two sectors of society can be illustrated in a more detailed way, 
as shown in Figure 2:  
-  The government systematically impacts on economic activity via a large number of 
policy instruments, ranging from taxes and public expenditures to all sorts of regula-
tions. This is the policy function; 
-  Economic activity, as reflected in the size and change of GNP, the rate of unemploy-
ment and the rate of inflation, determines government popularity and hence the proba-
bility of reelection. This is the popularity function.   3 
Figure 2: Politico-Economic Model. 
 
Political economy and Public Choice have studied these interactions for over 60 years
1. It is 
the purpose of this paper to provide a critical discussion of this literature, which may be called 
politometrics.  
There are many other parts of Political Economy not treated  here. Examples are (see 
Ostrom 2011): 
-  Incentive problems connected with public goods. Olson (1965) argued that individuals 
have no incentive to contribute to such goods as they can consume them even if they 
do not help to provide them. Exceptions arise when the number of individuals con-
cerned is small, which entails that they can exert pressure to participate, or when there 
is a repeated interaction with an open end that may, under favorable conditions, induce 
individuals to contribute. Most importantly, the government may force individuals by 
imposing taxes. The fundamental public good problem was later applied to resources 
and named the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968, Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 
1994). Since then, the conditions under which the supply of public goods is likely to 
                                                 
1 For general surveys on political economy see the fundamental work by Mueller 1979, 1989, 2003. 
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arise has been studied intensively, most importantly by Ostrom (1990), who collected 
a large data set referring to many different public goods situations. 
-  New Institutional Economics, which originated in Coase’s (1937) question of why 
firms exist. Other important contributions are by North (1981) analyzing the structure 
of institutions and their change over time, and Williamson (1975) looking at the trans-
action costs as a determinant of organizations. 
-  The structure and performance of local public economies and  polycentric systems 
such as self-governance (e.g. Ostrom 1970). In this context a new form of governance 
built on a web of multiple intersecting governments, or Functional, Overlapping and 
Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ, Frey and Eichenberger 1999) has been suggested.   
Part I of this paper deals with the various approaches to political economy based on empiri-
cally tested or politometric models. I will discuss to what extent standard economics takes the 
mutual interaction of the economy and the polity into account. I will then turn to models ex-
plicitly capturing this interdependence, the “politico-economic models”. These approaches 
take the institutional setting of society as given and study how the various actors behave with-
in these restrictions. 
Part II looks at the institutional setting. It is taken to be exogenous; the effect of particular 
rules of the game on politico-economic outcomes will be studied here. 
The following part takes institutions to be endogenous. The corresponding studies seek to 
explain why particular institutions emerge. It discusses recent empirical models that explicitly 
analyze how the political and economic institutions of a society are shaped by fundamental 
(exogenous) forces and past events. 
Based on this overview, the final part of the paper inquires whether political economy has 
been a success or a failure. It has certainly been a success in terms of the attention received 
and the position gained in economic research and teaching. At the same time, the conclusion 
is also somewhat pessimistic. In many instances in which the politico-economic interaction is 
crucial, a significant number of scholars still construct models based on the assumption that 
governments want to, and are actually able to, maximize social welfare. Happiness research, 
one of the most thriving recent areas of economics, will be considered as an important case in 
point. Significant scholars in happiness research wish to charge government with the task of 
pursuing, and maximizing, the aggregate happiness of the population as an expression of so-  5 
cial welfare. In this regard, the fundamental lessons and insights of political economy are still 
disregarded. 
 
I.  Politometrics   
The mutual dependence of economy and polity seems to be so obvious that one might think 
that the interaction is fully accounted for in economic research. However, this is not the case 
in standard economics. 
 
A.  Standard Economics 
We can distinguish various stages in how economists have dealt with the issue raised: 
(a)   The economy today is rarely treated as a closed system, though scholars fascinated by 
the general equilibrium model of Arrow-Debreu (1954) still focus solely on economic 
activity and thus disregard the public sector. The more recent versions of computable 
general equilibrium models generally include the public sector but model it simplistical-
ly. 
(b)   Some economic models treat the public sector as exogenous. They study, for instance, 
how changes in public expenditures, in taxation or in regulations affect the economy. 
This is, of course, a perfectly legitimate view. And yet, it remains too narrow because it 
ignores that the public sector acts in reaction to economic activity. 
(c)   Most importantly, an approach that has a long history in economics and remains popular 
today is to start from the presumption that government maximizes social welfare. This 
has been the expressive goal of the “quantitative theory of economic policy” that was 
championed by Tinbergen (1956) and Theil (1964) and that is still popular today. For 
instance, recent “libertarian paternalism” (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 2008) based on the 
behavioural, or rather the psychological-economic view of human action, and in particu-
lar of decision-making, implicitly assumes that governments would be satisfied by 
simply “nudging” people in directions furthering social welfare. But it may well be that 
governments attempt to nudge people in a direction beneficial for the politicians in 
power but harmful for society as a whole.   6 
The above approach assumes that governments maximize social welfare. This is defended by 
arguing that the resulting socially optimal policy indicates the direction public policy should 
go. However, this view is faced with the fundamental theoretical problem that no social wel-
fare function exists if some rather narrow conditions (such as e.g. single peakedness, see 
Black 1948) are not fulfilled. These conditions are certainly violated as soon as distributional 
aspects are involved – which is nearly always the case in real life policy decisions. As a con-
sequence, the social welfare maximization approach is based on questionable theoretical 
foundations and does not indicate how social welfare can be increased. Moreover, the content 
of the “social welfare function”, i.e. the determinants and their weights, has not been deter-
mined empirically
2. It is, of course, possible to simply assume the weights of the various de-
terminants, for example that a rise in unemployment by one percentage point reduces social 
welfare by the same amount as a rise in the rate of inflation by one percentage point, and to 
then derive the government’s optimal policy. This may provide useful information and should 
thus not be totally dismissed. However, it reflects a technocratic approach that is far from 
enabling government to truly maximize social welfare. 
 
B.  Explicitly Modeling Politico-Economic Interaction 
Various branches of economics have endeavored to account for the politico-economic interac-
tion. The classics of economic theory like Adam Smith and Karl Max wrote about Political 
Economy and analyzed the interaction between the political and the economic sector. Howev-
er, since Political Economy was soon equated with Marxism, the further developments in the 
study of politico-economic interaction were relabeled Public Choice. This was all the more 
warranted since Political Economy had ignored the processes inside the political sector, the 
polity. Public Choice filled this gap by modeling the behavior of politicians and bureaucrats 
as rational and self-interested.
3  
 
                                                 
2 Some scholars argue that happiness research has changed this situation. However, as will be discussed in sec-
tion IV, such empirical determination runs into yet another problem, namely that governments will have a strong 
incentive to manipulate reported happiness. 
3 A special part of Public Choice is called “Social Choice”. It analyzes the problems arising when individual 
preferences are aggregated to a social welfare or social decision function. Arrow (1951) and Sen (1970) received 
a Nobel Prize for their respective contributions.   7 
B.1  The Virginia School and Public Choice 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, two scholars working at the same time at the Universi-
ty of Virginia, constructed a more general model of the interaction of the economy and the 
polity (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). They employ the standard assumptions about the behav-
ior of economic actors to study the behavior of politicians and public officials. In particular, 
they assume that politicians strive for the retention of power and reject the notion that they 
pursue the good of the citizens. The Virginia school has produced a large number of analyses 
of politico-economic interactions based on the assumption of self-interested politicians and 
bureaucrats. 
An important and widely used model of Public Choice based on the assumption of politicians 
maximizing their own utility is the Median Voter Model. Where the interaction between the 
economy and the polity is made explicit, the vote maximization model is most often used in 
the basic form of the median voter model. Two political parties will converge to the same 
position on one given issue, which equals the median voter in the overall distribution of vot-
ers’ preferences. Consequently, in a regression analysis, the median value of the relevant de-
terminants is taken rather than the average. To be precise, the researchers should take the in-
come (or any other determinant) of the median voter (this is not necessarily the same as the 
median income). It is however often overlooked that the median voter model only works un-
der narrow institutional conditions. Most importantly, vote maximization by each of the par-
ties only leads to the choice of the median value of the variables if there are strictly two par-
ties, and if no additional parties may enter this political competition for votes. There are few, 
if any, democracies in which this strict assumption holds. Even in the United States or the 
United Kingdom with their respective two dominant parties, additional parties or contenders 
participate in presidential elections. When three or more parties compete, they may take quite 
diverging positions, depending mainly on the possibility to form coalitions. Moreover, the 
median voter model applies only when the number of voters participating in an election is 
fixed; it may not vary in response to the positions taken by the parties. Such a strict assump-
tion excludes the possibility that some citizens decide to abstain when a party program is too 
much in the center. This behavior would give parties the incentive to move away from the 
common median position. Consequently, the median voter model rarely applies in actual situ-
ations. Its popularity seems to stem from the fact that it leads to a well-defined equilibrium 
and therewith allows the researcher to derive clear predictions.   8 
Notwithstanding this criticism, the median voter model may be used to analyze referenda or 
initiatives in which there are strictly only two outcomes possible: accept or reject (see e.g. 
Pommerehne and Frey 1976, Romer and Rosenthal 1978, 1979, 1982). However, few coun-
tries in the world use this kind of direct democratic decision procedure, Switzerland being the 
great exception (see Pommerehne 1978). Therefore, the respective empirical research is use-
ful only to indicate what would be in the interest of those citizens who care to participate in 
such referenda (in Switzerland the vote participation rate for referenda is about 45% in the 
long run average). It does not necessarily indicate what policies the citizens, and the popula-
tion as a whole, desire to see implemented. 
While the median voter model is certainly elegant, produces an equilibrium outcome and al-
lows testing empirical implications, the assumptions about the political sector both with re-
spect to the parties and the citizens are extremely narrow and thus rarely fulfilled in reality. 
 
B.2  Political Business Cycles 
The interaction between the economy and the polity has been analyzed in various quantitative 
and empirical ways. 
The government is assumed to maximize votes at exogenously determined election dates sub-
ject to the constraints imposed by the state of the economy. Assuming the probability of re-
election to depend on the rate of unemployment and the rate of inflation, and letting the econ-
omy be represented by an extended Phillips-curve, a political business cycle results 
(Nordhaus 1975). After an election, the government undertakes a restrictive policy, raising the 
rate of unemployment but reducing future inflation expectations. Towards the election date, 
the government undertakes an expansionary policy, reducing the rate of unemployment while 
still profiting from a low inflation rate. This politico-economic cycle repeats itself infinitely, 
i.e. there is no learning on the part of voters or politicians. 
A number of scholars have used similar models and some have found different political busi-
ness cycles. An empirical study finds that, contrary to the predictions of Nordhaus’ model, 
left-wing governments tend to undertake an expansionary policy after winning an election, 
and over the election term move to a more restrictive policy (Paldam 1979).   9 
A broader approach uses an econometric model in which the economy is a constraint to gov-
ernment. The political agents are analyzed in line with the economic model of human behav-
ior. Politicians maximize their own utility, which consists in ideological goals as well as in 
the pleasure derived from being in power, the rents extracted, and the recognition received by 
the voters. They are constrained by the need to be re-elected so that only a government confi-
dent to be re-elected according to the popularity function can pursue a purely ideological poli-
cy. A left-wing party tends to increase, and a right-wing party tends to decrease taxes and 
public spending. If the popularity function of the incumbent indicates that re-election is uncer-
tain, the politicians in power undertake popularity increasing economic policies. These mod-
els have been empirically tested for various industrial (Frey and Schneider 1975, 1978a, 
1978b, 1979, 1981) as well as for less developed countries (Praschnik 1991, Head 1992, 
Mendoza 1992a, 1992b, for surveys see Frey and Schneider 1988, Frey 1983). Unlike the 
models derived by Nordhaus and followers, these models do not produce a pre-determined 
and identical political business cycle. Rather, the shape of the politico-economic cycles de-
pends on a number of determinants, including the economic conditions and the nature of po-
litical competition. Political competition in turn is determined by the number and vote shares 
of parties competing, as well as by the coalitions that are likely to be formed. 
In the literature based on Nordhaus’ model, voters are assumed to be myopic. However, such 
extremely myopic voters that never learn from their mistakes are difficult to reconcile with 
the assumption of actors with rational expectations on which public choice is critically based. 
Rational expectations were first introduced in the partisan-politics model by Minford and Peel 
(1982) but the paper by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) received most attention. When voters 
are rational and forward-looking there is no Political Business Cycle – in stark contrast to the 
regularly occurring Nordhaus cycle.  
The cycle reappears only when voters are assumed to be uncertain about the timing of the 
elections, as is the case in the United Kingdom as well as under specific conditions also in 
many other countries. 
A variety of Political Business Cycle models with rational voters and opportunistic politicians 
appeared (Rogoff and Sibert 1988, Persson and Tabellini 1990, Rogoff 1990, Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1995) in which the parties or candidates differ in their abilities to macromanage the 
economy. These models with not fully informed voters predict that governments will increase 
certain categories of spending, run deficits, and perhaps create extra inflation just prior to an 
election. Voters are assumed to be perfectly impartial and without any loyalties.   10 
Consistent with a partisan voter model, Frey and Schneider (1978a) showed that the support 
for the president is more sensitive to changes in unemployment the lower the group’s income. 
Empirical evidence suggests that blue-collar and unskilled workers are more concerned with 
high unemployment whereas wealthier people care more about the inflation rate (see Schnei-
der and Frey 1988 for a review). 
The next stage of opportunistic voter models consisted in modeling voters as retrospective 
(Fiorina 1977, 1981) and including such voters in models of partisan politics (Hibbs 1987, 
1992, 1994, 2000), i.e. where politicians depend on party machines and are ideologically 
committed to the position of the party to which they belong. 
 
II.  Rules of the Game 
The politico-economic models discussed so far take the fundamental “rules of the game”, the 
constitutional or institutional setting which structures human interaction in society, to be giv-
en exogenously. This part of the paper reviews the study of the effects that the underlying 
constitutional setting has on decision-making. The term “constitution” (sometimes also called 
“institution”, see e.g. North 1990, 2005) includes the formal and even informal rules shaping 
human interaction. Thus, the term goes well beyond the written constitution. Constitutional 
economists are most interested in the rules governing societal proceedings that finally result 
in collective decisions (Buchanan 1975, 1991, Frey 1983). 
 
A.  The Constitutional Approach  
The interaction between the economy and the polity can be looked at in terms of a game tak-
ing place under particular institutional conditions (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Brennan and 
Buchanan 1985, Mueller 1996, 2001). The outcome of this process is fundamentally shaped 
by the rules under which these interactions take place. The rules can be formally written 
down, as in a country’s constitution, or unwritten, in the form of norms or customs and habits. 
Rules matter when they shape individuals’ behavior. The effects of constitutions on behavior 
are not always straightforward; indeed there are countries in which the written constitution 
looks democratic but where reality follows quite different patterns.    11 
According to constitutional economics, institutions influence the process of interaction and 
the outcome of political and economic processes. Hence three different stages may be distin-
guished:  
(1) The most fundamental level at which a choice is made between the many possible rules of 
the  game. This choice may occur behind the veil of uncertainty  (Rawls 1971, Buchanan 
1976), or may consider new forms of organizing economic activity.  
(2) The constitutional stage where the consequences of the various fundamental rules of the 
game are analyzed;  
(3) The current stage where, taking these rules as given, the participants in the game make 
political and economic decisions serving to maximize their utility function. The current politi-
co-economic process thus is endogenous and cannot be influenced from outside. In particular, 
advice offered to government by scholars on matters of economic policy will be disregarded 
except if it is in the politicians’ self-interest, i.e. if it allows for re-election and maximization 
of power. In general, the politicians know well enough how to undertake self-beneficial eco-
nomic policies within the given institutional constraints. This conclusion about the ineffec-
tiveness of policy advice stands in stark contrast to the idea that scholars have a notable im-
pact on the economic decisions taken by politicians. Economic advice will only be considered 
and followed by politicians if they do not know how to otherwise design a policy that is in 
their own interest. But to offer advice to further the “public good” (however defined) has no 
effect on political decisions. This means that there is a fundamental difference to the standard 
welfare approach to economic policy. This is rarely noticed and acknowledged. Quite often, 
analyses start from the idea that governments maximize social welfare, and only then intro-
duce some political elements such as the influence of government bureaucracy or interest 
groups. Such an approach disregards the basic interaction or game played by actors pursuing 
their own utility. In principle, economic advisers cannot influence the resulting interactions 
from the outside as each actor is behaving in a way conforming to his interests. If this holds, 
the outcome of the interaction can only be influenced by changes in the rules of the game, or 
the constitution shaping these interactions. 
Thus, effective economic policy advice has to focus on political and economic institutions 
(see also North 1981, 1990, 2005). Behind the veil of ignorance, economists should offer ad-
vice about which institutions lead to outcomes reflecting individual preferences.    12 
The importance of institutional or constitutional rules in determining the outcome of politico-
economic interaction seems to be obvious. Nevertheless, much of economic analysis tends to 
disregard not only the current stage with given institutions, as discussed above, but also the 
constitutional stage. 
Most modern textbooks on economics discuss the workings of the economy only within a 
given institutional setting. This was the case in Keynesian economics but still tarnishes far 
more recent versions of economic theory. A perfectly competitive market is often just as-
sumed to exist and the effects of policies are simply derived from this particular institutional 
form. Comparative institutional analysis of different rules of the game, e.g. of a competitive 
market, of a market with strong bureaucratic interventions and of an economy without well-
defined property rights, tend to be disregarded, especially in macroeconomics. The issue with 
this neglect becomes particularly obvious in the political sphere. To take an extreme example, 
consider offering economic advice to an authoritarian ruler. This would have very different 
implications than to do so for a democratically elected government. There is little point in 
advising the former to undertake a policy designed to further the “common good” as the rul-
er’s interest is quite different. Rather, the interests of the groups on whose support the ruler 
relies, often the military, count. 
 
B.  “Political Economics” 
Over the last few years a new research direction labeled Political Economics emerged. It stud-
ies the interaction of political and economic activities by comparing the different outcomes of 
institutional rules, i.e. it deals with level (2). This approach uses more modern econometric 
methods than had previously been used, but it ignores the decade-old and relevant Public 
Choice literature (Mueller 2007). State-of-the-art econometric techniques are used to study 
the impacts of different constitutional settings on economic outcomes. An important contribu-
tion to this literature is Persson and Tabellini (1990, 1999, 2005) who compare the economic 
consequences of two constitutional choices: (1) a majoritarian vs. a proportional representa-
tion electoral rule and (2) a presidential vs. a parliamentary form of government.  
Persson and Tabellini find that majoritarian electoral rules increase electoral competition, thus 
resulting in less rents for politicians, less redistribution by the central government, reduced 
deficits and smaller central government. Moreover, presidential systems lead to a lower sup-  13 
ply of public goods, less rents for politicians, less redistribution, and smaller government. 
They also find that the large electoral districts that are found in proportional representation 
systems entail more corruption and that parliamentary forms of government are associated 
with higher productivity. These findings are empirically validated with a large longitudinal 
data set. 
Later on, Persson and Tabellini (2005) explain the theoretical mismatch they had found with 
respect to redistribution and proportional elections with a new model. The fragmented party 
system often leads to coalition governments within which there is electoral competition induc-
ing governing parties to increase spending by the central government. Furthermore, they pro-
vide a politico-economic perspective on the nexus between development and democracy by 
highlighting the importance of sequencing: countries liberalizing their economy before ex-
tending political rights fare better. 
Clearly, these contributions are noteworthy – what remains questionable is whether this re-
search is in fact a new development in the political business cycle literature within Public 
Choice theory. On a more general note addressed to Persson and Tabellini, Acemoglu and co-
authors and related literature, Mueller criticizes the “tendency to re-label public choice and 
then pretend one has discovered something new” (2007: 67). 
 
III.  Endogenous Institutions 
This section considers how the choice between different institutions is taken, i.e. it refers to 
level (1). 
In constitutional economics following Buchanan, there is no causality issue because the two 
stages of the choice of rules and decisions within rules are neatly separated and looked at in a 
quite different way. Constitutional decisions are taken behind the veil of ignorance, meaning 
that the individuals who make the decisions do not know in which situation they will be in the 
future. In reality, such a situation rarely obtains. Rather, many individuals are confident that 
they will belong to a certain group or class in the future, and will accordingly try to influence 
the constitutional elements chosen. 
The scholars engaging in “political economics” are aware of the causality problem: Institu-
tions determine policy decisions and outcomes, but the latter also influence the institutions   14 
existing. However, to identify the causalities is difficult, and several attempts have remained 
unsatisfactory (Acemoglu 2005). 
A valiant and most influential approach has been made by identifying institutions far back in 
history, which under no circumstance can affect today’s economic outcomes (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson 2001, 2002). Other approaches consider other exogenous influences 
such as weather conditions (e.g. Brunner 2003). 
Another and even more recent approach inquires whether it is possible to find a new form of 
economic organization so far not explored. Thus, the concept of “seasteading” has been sug-
gested as a way to undertake economic activities in the seas, similar to what used to exist in 
former times and what was called “homesteading” (Economist 2011). The organizations es-
tablished in the sea and thus beyond national boundaries can choose an efficient way to do 
business and to spend their leisure time. High mobility is assured. In particular, firms and in-
dividuals who do not agree with the rules existing in a particular seafaring place may leave 
with low cost and join a seafaring place better suited for their preferences. While these new 
forms of organization seem to be somewhat exotic, there exist organizations performing simi-
lar tasks; for instance, ships stationed just outside the national boundary of the United States 
offering casinos. Similarly, ships outside the national boundary of a nation where birth control 
is prohibited may offer medical and hospital services to women whishing abortion. 
 
IV.  Success or Failure? 
It may well be argued that Political Economy has made great progress since its first develop-
ments in the 1950s and 1960s. The theoretical models of the polity have become more re-
fined, the interactions better specified, and the role of institutions has increasingly been taken 
into account. Furthermore, the field has become empirical, using the most advanced estima-
tion techniques. 
Political Economy has also been a success with respect to the institutions that are devoted to 
its study. There is an American and a European Public Choice Society and the International 
Society of New Institutional Economics (ISNIE) offering yearly conferences with a large 
number of participants. There are various journals devoted to the subject, such as Public 
Choice, Constitutional Political Economy, or the European Journal of Political Economy.   15 
A further clear success of Political Economy has been the considerable number of Nobel Priz-
es given to respective scholars. Arrow and Sen on Social Choice, Buchanan on Constitutional 
Economics, and North and Ostrom on Institutional Economics are undisputed exponents. But 
Coase, Williamson, and Becker may also be counted to the group of Political Economists at 
large
4.  
Nevertheless, this progress is mitigated by the fact that the basic ideas of political economy 
are all too often disregarded in mainstream economics. One can still find works with the im-
plicit, and sometimes even explicit, assumption that benevolent governments technocratically 
maximize social welfare. The Political Economy is still often captured in overly simplistic 
models– such as the median voter model – because this allows to easily derive equilibrium 
outcomes. While the recent contributions relating the economic and political sectors are im-
pressive, they have to some extent remained within a specialist community of scholars. Their 
effect on general economics is not very large, but compared to the former self-contained eco-
nomic theory that completely disregarded politics, much has been achieved. 
Meanwhile, in comparison to standard economics as presently en vogue, one can well be dis-
appointed. In particular, the fundamental role of institutions in shaping the behavior of both, 
political and economic actors, is often disregarded. 
This latter statement can be illustrated by policy recommendations emerging from one of the 
most recent and thriving fields in economics, happiness research. It will be argued that the 
policy consequences suggested are still  guided by a technocratic benevolent dictator ap-
proach. 
Modern, empirically orientated economic research on happiness was started by van Praag and 
Kapteyn (1973) and Easterlin (1974). Since then, the major determinants of subjective report-
ed well-being, in particular of life satisfaction, have been identified (for surveys see Frey and 
Stutzer 2002a,b, 2005, Dolan et al. 2008, Frey 2008). Thus, we now know much about how 
socio-demographic factors (such as age, marriage and personal relationships), economic fac-
tors (such as income and its distribution, unemployment, or inflation), cultural factors (such as 
race or religion), or political factors (extent of democracy and decentralization) affect happi-
ness. 
                                                 
4 However, some “Anti-Political Economy” scholars such as Tinbergen or Mirlees who ex-
plicitly base their research on social welfare maximization also received Nobel Prizes.   16 
Several prominent happiness researchers (e.g. Layard, Frank, Oswald, or Diener) suggest that 
governments should maximize happiness. At last, the dream of economists seems to have 
come true: the social welfare function has been empirically filled and thus can and should be 
maximized.    
Politicians have been eager to pick up this new science (Layard 1995) as it promotes the im-
pression that they care for their citizens. The King of Bhutan, the French President, the British 
Prime Minister, the Chinese President and politicians of several other countries stated that 
they now wanted to pursue policies maximizing or increasing happiness. This sounds like an 
excellent policy worth supporting, it seems difficult indeed to object to making people happi-
er. 
However, a more careful consideration reveals that a policy of happiness maximization is 
most doubtful and perhaps even dangerous in a democratic society. It corresponds to an idea 
where social welfare can and should be brought about by a government assumed to act solely 
in the interest of its citizens. This policy from above, by a technocratic, research-informed and 
benevolent government, stands in sharp contrast to one of the major points of Political Econ-
omy: politicians are rational individuals with their own goals and thus act like everybody else: 
in their own interest. A happiness maximizing policy is faced with several other major prob-
lems (Frey and Stutzer 2010). Respondents’ answers to representative surveys on their happi-
ness level tend to be biased when they are aware that the aggregate happiness index therewith 
constructed will be used for political purposes. Moreover, governments have a strong incen-
tive to manipulate the happiness indicator that is to be maximized. Happiness indicators are 
based on surveys and create many possibilities to influence the results in favor of the incum-
bent government.  
At the constitutional level (2), the government’s claim to pursue a happiness maximizing pol-
icy may make it difficult for opposing parties to argue against the party in power, which in 
turn undermines the intensity of political competition. 
Happiness research and the policy proposal that governments should maximize happiness is 
just one example suggesting that Political Economy has not been sufficiently integrated into 
economic thinking. 
Political Economy has obtained important results but must seek more actively to enlarge the 
perimeter of its application.   17 
References 
Acemoglu, Daron (2005). Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on 
Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Journal of Economic 
Literature 43(4): 1025-1048. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001). The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, American Economic Review 
91(5): 1369-1401. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2002). Reversal Of Fortune: Ge-
ography And Institutions In The Making Of The Modern World Income Distribution, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics: 117(4): 1231-1294. 
Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal (1995). Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and 
the Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Arrow Kenneth J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. and Gerard Debreu (1954). Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive 
economy, Econometrica 22: 265–290. 
Black, Duncan (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision-making,  Journal of Political 
Economy 56: 23–34. 
Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan (1985). The Reason of Rules. Constitutional Eco-
nomics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Brunner, Allan D. (2003). The Long-Run Effects of Trade on Income and Income Growth, 
IMF Working Papers 03/37, International Monetary Fund. 
Buchanan, James M. (1975): The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chica-
go: University of Chicago Press. 
Buchanan, James M. (1976). A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlesian Difference Princi-
ple. Kyklos 29: 5-25. 
Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent: Logical Founda-
tions of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.   18 
Coase, Ronald H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4(16): 386-405. 
Dolan, Paul, Tessa Peasgood and Mathew White (2008). Do we really know what makes us 
happy? A review of the economic literature on the factors associated with subjective 
well-being, Journal of Economic Psychology 29: 94-122.  
Easterlin, Richard A. (1974). Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empir-
ical Evidence, In Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder (eds.), Nations and Households 
in Economic Growth: Essays in Honour of Moses Abramowitz, New York: Academic 
Press.  
Economist (2011). Seasteading. Cities on the ocean. The Economist Technology Quarterly 
December 3rd 2011: 12-13. 
Fiorina, Morris P. (1977). An Outline for a Model of Party choice, American Journal of Polit-
ical Science 21(3): 601-686. 
Fiorina, Morris P. (1981). Some Problems in Studying the Effects of Resource Allocation in 
Congressional Elections. American Journal of Political Science 25: 543-567. 
Frey, Bruno S. (1983). Democratic Economic Policy. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Frey, Bruno S. (2008). Happiness: A Revolution in Economics, Cambridge and London: The 
MIT Press.  
Frey, Bruno S. and Reiner Eichenberger (1999). The New Democratic Federalism for Europe. 
Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions.Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, 
MA, USA: Elgar. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider (1975). On the Modelling of Politico-Economic Inter-
dependence, European Journal of Political Research 3(4): 339-360. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider (1978a). An empirical study of politico-economic 
interaction in the U.S., Review of Economics and Statistics, 1978. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider (1978b). A politico-economic model of the United 
Kingdom, The Economic Journal 88: 243-253.   19 
Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider (1979). An econometric model with an endogenous 
government sector, Public Choice 34: 29-43. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider (1981). Central Bank Behavior: A Positive Empirical 
Analysis, Journal of Monetary Economics 7(3): 291-316. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider (1988). Politico-Economic Models of Macroeconomic 
Policy: A Review of the Empirical Evidence. In: Thomas D. Willett (ed.), Political 
Business Cycles. The Political Economy of Money, Inflation, and Unemployment, 
Durham and London: Duke University Press: 240-275. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2002a). The Economics of Happiness, World Economics 
3(1): 25-41. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2002b). What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Re-
search? Journal of Economic Literature 40(2): 402 – 435. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2005). Happiness Research: State and Prospects, Review of 
Social Economy 63(2): 207-228. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2010). Happiness and Public Choice, Public Choice 144: 
557-573. 
Hardin, Garrett (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162: 1243-1248. 
Head, Allen (1995). Country Size, Aggregate Fluctuations, and International Risk Sharing, 
Canadian Journal of Economics 28 (4b): 1096-1119.  
Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. (1987). The Political Economy of Industrial Democracies, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. (1992). Partisan Theory after Fifteen Years, European Journal of Po-
litical Economy 8: 371-73. 
Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. (1994). The Partisan Model of Macroeconomic Cycles: More Theory 
and Evidence for the United States, Economics and Politics 6: 1-23. 
Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. (2000). Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections, Public 
Choice 104: 149-80.   20 
Layard, Richard (1995). Happiness: Lessons form a New Science. New York: Pinguin. 
Mendoza, Enrique G. (1992a). The effects of macroeconomic shocks in a basic equilibrium 
framework, IMF Staff Papers 39: 855-889. 
Mendoza, Enrique G. (1992b). The Terms of Trade and Economic Fluctuations, IMF Working 
Papers 92/98, International Monetary Fund.  
Minford, Patrick and David Peel (1982). The political theory of the business cycle, European 
Economic Review 17(2): 253-270. 
Mueller, Dennis (1996). Constitutional Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mueller, Dennis (ed.) (2001). The Economics of Politics, Cheltenham: E. Elgar. 
Mueller, Dennis C. (2003). Public Choice III, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mueller, Dennis (2007). Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Con-
stitutions, Constitutional Political Economy 18(1): 63-68. 
Nordhaus, William D. (1975). The political business cycle, Review of Economic Studies 42: 
169-190. 
North, Douglass C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History, New York, London: 
Norton. 
North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.  
North, Douglas C. (2005). Understanding the Process of Institutional Change, New York: 
Princeton University Press. 
Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, Elinor (2011). Coevolving Relationships between Political Science and Economics. 
Mimeo, Workshop on Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. 
Ostrom. Elinor, Roy Gardner and James Walker (1994). Rules, Games, and Common Pool 
Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.     21 
Olson, Mancur (1965).  The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Paldam, Martin (1979). Is there an Electional Cycle? A comparative study of national ac-
counts, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81(2): 323-42. 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1990), Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Poli-
tics, London: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1999). The size and scope of government: Comparative 
politics with rational politicians, European Economic Review 43(4-6): 699-735. 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2005). The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Cam-
bridge and London: The MIT Press. 
Pommerehne, Werner W. (1978). Institutional approaches to public expenditure : empirical 
evidence from Swiss municipalities, Journal of Public Economics 4: 255-280. 
Pommerehne, Werner W. and Bruno S. Frey (1976). Two approaches to estimating public 
expenditures, Public Finance Review 4(4): 395-407. 
Praschnik, Jack (1991). The regularities of international business cycle phenomena: Some 
evidence from developing countries, unpublished manuscript, University of Florida. 
Rawls, John (1971). The Reason of Rules. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Rogoff, Kenneth S. (1990). Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, American Economic Review 
80(1): 21-36. 
Rogoff, Kenneth S. and Anne Sibert (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. Re-
view of Economic Studies 55: 1–16. 
Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agen-
das, and the status quo, Public Choice 33: 27–43. 
Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal (1979). Bureaucrats versus voters: On the political 
economy of resource allocation by direct democracy, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
93: 563–587.   22 
Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal (1982). Median voters or budget maximizers: Evi-
dence from school expenditure referenda, Economic Inquiry 26: 556–578. 
Sen, Amartya K. (1970). Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day.  
Tinbergen, Jan (1956). Economic Policy: Principles and Design, Amsterdam: North- Holland 
Publishing Company. 
Thaler, Richard H. and Cass R. Sunstein (2003). Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron, 
The University of Chicago Law Review 70(4): 1159–1202. 
Thaler, Richard H. and Cass R. Sunstein (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, 
wealth, and happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press,  
Theil, Henri (1964). Optimal decision rules for government and industry. Amsterdam: North-
Holland Pub. Co., Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Van Praag, Bernard M. S. and Arie Kapteyn (1973). Further evidence on the individual wel-
fare function of income: An empirical investigation in The Netherlands, European Eco-
nomic Review 4(1): 33-62. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications, 
New York: Free Press. 
 
 